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THE CORPORATE PRIVACY PROXY
Shaakirrah R. Sanderst
This Article contributes to the First Amendment corporate
privacy debate by identifying the relevance of agriculture se-
curity legislation, or ag-gag laws. Ag-gag laws restrict meth-
ods used to gather and disseminate information about
commercial food cultivation, production, and distribution-po-
tentially creating a "right" to control or privatize nonproprie-
tary information about animal and agribusinesses. Yet,
corporate privacy rights are unrecognized as a matter of U.S.
constitutional law, which implicates the sufficiency of the jus-
tification for ag-gag laws. This Article ponders whether "se-
curity" acts as a proxy for an unrecognized right to corporate
privacy in the ag-gag context. Part I of this Article surveys the
ag-gag landscape. Part II of this Article describes the corpo-
rate privacy debate. Part III of this Article hypothesizes how
ag-gag laws arguably expand corporate privacy for animal
and agribusinesses to a degree that threatens the market-
place of ideas about the industry.
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INTRODUCTION
No federal challenge against agriculture security legislation
has examined the scope of the "right" that such laws seek to
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protect, namely, control over gathering and disseminating non-
proprietary information that harms or counters the commercial
reputation or the commercial representations of animal and
agribusinesses. This Article describes agriculture security leg-
islation as that which restricts-or "gags"-methods used to
gather and disseminate information about the conditions and
techniques of commercial food cultivation, production, and dis-
tribution. Food journalist Mark Bittman has used the term
"ag-gag" to describe agriculture security legislation.' Ag-gag
laws were enacted in Idaho,2 Iowa,3 Kansas,4 Missouri,5 Mon-
tana,6 North Carolina,7 North Dakota,8 Utah,9 and Wyoming.10
Although this Article focuses on agriculture security legis-
lation in Idaho, Utah, and Wyoming, Iowa was the first state to
punish the use of false information to gain access or employ-
1 Mark Bittman, Who Protects the Animals?, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Apr. 26,
2011 9:29 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/26/who-pro-
tects-the-animals/?r=0 [https://perma.cc/6D3B-LZP2]. See generally Shaakir-
rah R. Sanders, Ag-gag Free Nation, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 491, 493-94 (2019)
(identifying states that have adopted ag-gag laws).
2 IDAHO CODE § 18-7042 (2018) (prohibiting interference with agricultural
production), invalidated by Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d
1195, 1212 (D. Idaho 2015), ajf'd in part and rev'd in part by Animal Legal Def.
Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184 (9th CIr. 2018).
3 IOWA CODE § 717A.3A (2018) (prohibiting the use of false information to
gain access or employment for purposes of committing an unauthorized act),
invalidated by Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds, 353 F. Supp. 3d 812 (S.D.
Iowa 2019); see also Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds, 297 F. Supp. 3d 901,
928-29 (S.D. Iowa 2018) (denying motion to dismiss).
4 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(c)(4) (2018) (prohibiting entry into "an animal
facility to take pictures by photograph, video camera or by any other means" with
the intent of causing harm to the enterprise), invalidated by Animal Legal Def.
Fund v. Kelly, No. 18-2657-KHV, 2020 WL 362626 (D. Kan. 2020).
5 Mo. REV. STAT. § 578.013.1 (2018) (imposing a duty to submit recordings of
alleged farm animal abuse within 24 hours of recording).
6 MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-103(2)(e) (2017) (prohibiting entry into an animal
facility with the intent to record images or take pictures for purposes of criminal
defamation).
7 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2 (2018) (prohibiting unauthorized entry into non-
public area of another's premises).
8 N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21.1-02(6) (2017) (prohibiting entry into "an
animal facility and us[ing] or attempt[ing] to use a camera, video recorder, or any
other video or audio recording equipment").
9 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(2)(c)() (West 2018) (prohibiting the use of false
information on an employment application with the intent to record images at a
farm), invalidated by Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1193 (D.
Utah 2017).
10 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-414 (2018) (prohibiting trespass to unlawfully collect
"resource data"), constitutionally supported by W. Watersheds Project v. Michael,
196 F. Supp. 3d 1231 (D. Wyo. 2016), but undermined by W. Watersheds Project
v. Michael, 869 F.3d 1189 (10th Cir. 2017), and invalidated by W. Watersheds
Project v. Michael, 353 F. Supp. 3d 1176, 1191 (D. Wyo. 2018).
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ment at an animal or agribusiness.1 1  Other states passed
analogous or distinguishable agriculture security legislation.
North Carolina, for example, broadly imposes civil liability for
unauthorized entry into nonpublic areas of another's prem-
ises.12 Kansas prohibits "enter[ing] an animal facility to take
pictures by photograph, video camera or by any other means"
with the intent of causing harm to the enterprise.13 Montana
11 IOWA CODE § 717A.2 (2018) provides in part:
A person shall not, without the consent of the owner,... [ejnter onto
or into an animal facility, or remain on or in an animal facility, if the
person has notice that the facility is not open to the public, [or] if the
person has an intent to . .. [dlisrupt operations conducted at the
animal facility, if the operations directly relate to agricultural pro-
duction, animal maintenance, educational or scientific purposes, or
veterinary care.
Additionally, section 717A.2.2 provides that
[a] person suffering damages resulting from an action which is in
violation of [this statute] may bring an action in the district court
against the person causing the damage to recover ... [a]n amount
equaling three times all actual and consequential damages ... [and]
[clourt costs and reasonable attorney fees.
12 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2(a) (2018) provides that
[a]ny person who intentionally gains access to the nonpublic areas
of another's premises and engages in an act that exceeds the per-
son's authority to enter those areas is liable to the owner or operator
of the premises for any damages ustained. For the purposes of this
section, 'nonpublic areas' shall mean those areas not accessible to
or not intended to be accessed by the general public.
Section 99A-2(b) defines
an act that exceeds a person's authority to enter the nonpublic
areas of another's premises [as] any of the following: (1) An employee
who enters the nonpublic areas of an employer's premises for a
reason other than a bona fide intent of seeking or holding employ-
ment or doing business with the employer and thereafter without
authorization captures or removes the employer's data, paper,
records, or any other documents and uses the information to breach
the person's duty of loyalty to the employer[;] (2) An employee who
intentionally enters the nonpublic areas of an employer's premises
for a reason other than a bona fide intent of seeking or holding
employment or doing business with the employer and thereafter
without authorization records images or sound occurring within an
employer's premises and uses the recording to breach the person's
duty of loyalty to the employer[;] (3) Knowingly or intentionally plac-
ing on the employer's premises an unattended camera or electronic
surveillance device and using that device to record images or data.
Section 99A-2(d) allows a court to:
award to a party who prevails in an action brought pursuant o this
section one or more of the following remedies: (1) Equitable relief[;]
(2) Compensatory damages as otherwise allowed by State or federal
law[;] (3) Costs and fees, including reasonable attorneys' fees[; and]
(4) Exemplary damages as otherwise allowed by State or federal law
in the amount of five thousand dollars ($5,000) for each day, or
portion thereof, that a defendant has acted in violation of [section
99A-2(a)].
13 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(c) (West 2018) provides in part that "[n]o person
shall, without the effective consent of the owner and with the intent to damage the
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prohibits entering an animal facility with the intent to record
images or take pictures for purposes of criminal defamation.14
Similarly, North Dakota, prohibits entering an animal facility
and using or attempting to use a camera, video recorder, or any
other video or audio recording equipment. 15 Missouri imposes
a duty to submit recordings of alleged farm animal abuse
within 24 hours.16
Corporate or organizational "security" in commercial food
operations could be a justification for agriculture security legis-
lation. However, this interest must be more than legitimate if
ag-gag laws are to survive a First Amendment challenge be-
cause commercial food production operations are of public in-
terest. Moreover, undercover investigations into the industry
have long received First Amendment protection.17  Federal
enterprise conducted at the animal facility .... enter an animal facility to take
pictures by photograph, video camera or by any other means." KAN. STAT. ANN. §-
47.1828 (West 2018) provides that
[a]ny person who has been damaged by reason of a violation of
K.S.A. 47-1827 ... may bring an action in the district court against
the person causing the damage to recover ... [an amount equal to
three times all actual and consequential damages [and] ... court
costs and reasonable attorney fees.
14 MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-103(2) (2017) provides in part that
[a] person who does not have the effective consent of the owner and
who intends to damage the enterprise conducted at an animal facil-
ity may not ... enter an animal facility to take pictures by photo-
graph, video camera, or other means with the intent to commit
criminal defamation ....
MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-104 (2017) provides that
[a] person who has been damaged by reason of a violation of 81-30-
103 may bring against the person who caused the damage an action
in the district court to recover ... an amount equal to three times all
actual and consequential damages . . . and . . . court costs and
reasonable attorney fees.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-105 (2017) imposes criminal penalties for violations of
§ 81-30-103.
15 N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21.1-02 (2017) provides that "[n]o person without
the effective consent of the owner may . .. [elnter an animal facility and use or
attempt to use a camera, video recorder, or any other video or audio recording
equipment."
16 Mo. REV. STAT. § 578.013.1 (2018) provides that
[w]henever any farm animal professional videotapes or otherwise
makes a digital recording of what he or she believes to depict a farm
animal subjected to abuse or neglect .. . such farm animal profes-
sional shall have a duty to submit such videotape or digital record-
ing to a law enforcement agency within twenty-four hours of the
recording.
Intentional violations of this statute constitute a class A misdemeanor. See id.
§ 578.013.3.
17 See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Kelly, No. 18-2657-KHV, 2020 WL 362626
(D. Kan. 2020); Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Reynolds, 353 F. Supp. 3d 812, 827
(S.D. Iowa 2019) (holding Iowa's statute criminalizing accessing an agricultural
facility under false pretenses and making false statements as an employee uncon-
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court challenges against some ag-gag laws revealed legislative
motives to insulate animal and agribusinesses from "the court
of public opinion" by targeting those who "masquerade as em-
ployees to infiltrate farms in the hope of discovering and re-
cording what they believe to be animal abuse."18 Legislatures
also sought to prevent the release of video recordings of sus-
pected animal abuse19 by stopping "people who would go 'run-
ning out to a news outlet.'"20 Some legislators described
animal rights investigators and activists as "hostage" takers,
"marauding invaders," "terrorists," and "enemies" to be
combated.2 1
This Article theorizes that in the context of agriculture se-
curity legislation, "security" acts as a proxy for "privacy."
Whalen v. Roe rejected an absolute or fundamental right to
control information.22 Further, outside of the Fourth Amend-
ment's protection against unreasonable government searches
and seizures, and state and federal laws that protect trade
secrets and other propriety information,2 3 corporate privacy
"rights" are limited in the United States.24 The U.S. Constitu-
tion does not grant First Amendment privacy rights to corpora-
stitutional under the First Amendment); W. Watersheds Project v. Michael, 353 F.
Supp. 3d 1176, 1191 (D. Wyo. 2018) (holding Wyoming statutes criminalizing
entering private land for the purposes of data collection unconstitutional under
the First Amendment); Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1193,
1211-13 (D. Utah 2017) (holding Utah's statute criminalizing accessing an agri-
cultural operation under false pretenses and recording an operation unconstitu-
tional under the First Amendment); Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp.
3d 1195, 1200 (D. Idaho 2015), affd in part and rev'd in part by Animal Legal Def.
Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding Idaho's law criminalizing
interference with agricultural production unconstitutional under the First
Amendment).
18 Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1200-01 (citing Declaration of Jo Ann Wall
Supporting Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Exhibit C at 8-9,
Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 312 F. Supp. 3d 939 (D. Idaho 2015)).
19 Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1201.
20 Editorial Board, No More Exposes in North Carolina, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/01/opinion/no-more-exposes-in-
north-carolina.html [https://perma.cc/H56Y-HANL].
21 See Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1200-01.
22 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977).
23 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also, Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1831 (2018) (prohibiting use of trade secrets to benefit foreign governments,
agents, or instrumentalities); Defend Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (2018)
(authorizing civil action in federal court for misappropriation of trade secrets);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-801 (West 2011) (providing injunctive relief and damages for
the disclosure of trade secrets); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3320 (West 2018) (providing
injunctive relief and damages for the disclosure of trade secrets).
24 See Kayla Robinson, Note, Corporate Rights and Individual Interests: The
Corporate Right to Privacy as a Bulwark Against Warrantless Government Surveil-
lance, 36 CARDOZO L. REv. 2283, 2288 (2015).
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tions or other organizations.25 The Restatement (Second) of
Torts denies a "personal right of privacy" for corporations, part-
nerships or unincorporated associations,26 except for informa-
tion that is "highly intimate"27 or otherwise protected by
contracts or trade law.
This Article ponders whether corporate or organizational
security or privacy provides sufficient justification to disrupt
activity that has traditionally received First Amendment pro-
tection. Idaho attempted to argue that corporate privacy justi-
fied its agriculture security legislation.28 During oral
argument, the Ninth Circuit reminded Idaho of the non-exis-
tence of corporate privacy rights.29 To the extent that states
can create a statutory corporate "right" to privacy, the right
should be no greater than that of individual privacy and the
same First Amendment limitations should apply. One limita-
tion relates to commercial speech under Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, which denies First
Amendment protection to false or misleading commercial
speech.30
This Article brings agriculture security legislation into the
corporate privacy debate. In United States v. Alvarez, the Court
reflected on how the First Amendment should encourage "more
speech, not .. . silence"3 1 on issues relating to the "unfettered
interchange of ideas."32 Alan Chen and Justin Marceau, the
leading ag-gag scholars, discuss the false speech analysis an-
nounced in Alvarez.33 Leading food law scholars do so as well,
25 See generally FCC v. AT&T, 562 U.S. 397 (2011) (holding that corporations
do not have "personal privacy" for the purposes of the Freedom of Information Act
exemption under 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(7)(C)).
26 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6521, cmt. c (AM. LAw INST. 1977).
27 Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1182,
1188 (D. Ariz. 1998), aff'd, 306 F.3d 806 (9th Ctr. 2002) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
28 Oral Argument at 8:14, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184
(9th Cir. 2018) (No. 15-35960), https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/
view_video.php?pkvid=0000011554 [https://perma.cc/TQ9D-645X].
29 Id.
30 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 593
(1980).
31 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 727-28 (2012) (quoting Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
32 Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 235-36 (2014) (quoting Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
33 See generally Alan K. Chen & Justin Marceau, Developing a Taxonomy of
Lies Under the First Amendment, 89 U. COLO. L. REv. 655 (2018) [hereinafter
Taxonomy of Lies] (discussing the framework and impact of United States v. Alva-
rez); Alan K. Chen & Justin Marceau, High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First
Amendment, 68 VAND. L. REv. 1435, 1480-83 (2015) [hereinafter High Value Lies]
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but many also theorize about how the marketplace of ideas
helps consumers "sort out" commercial messaging.34 The mar-
ketplace functions inefficiently when there is a lack of "diversity
of voices speaking to how food is produced."3 5 Consumer inter-
est in "where their food comes from and how it is produced" has
increased.36 Research confirms the demand for more trans-
parency at every level37 and consumer interest in the "free flow
of commercial information" about food production is often
sparked by exposes.38 "Consumers likewise recognize and ap-
preciate the vital information that journalists, whistleblowers,
and activists have to share about" the industry.39
Part I of this Article presents the ag-gag landscape and
examines the scholarship and legal advocacy of Chen and
Marceau. Part I also demonstrates how the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits have thus far declined to scrutinize the scope of the
corporate "right" to privacy when determining the constitution-
ality of ag-gag laws. Part I does not disparage the circuits'
choice, but instead looks forward to a potential challenge that
will require a determination of the sufficiency of corporate pri-
vacy as a rationale.
(considering the facts and holding of United States v. Alvarez in the context of the
First Amendment); Justin F. Marceau, Ag Gag Past, Present, and Future, 38
SEATTLE U. L. REv. 1317 (2015) (establishing Marceau's authority on the topic of
ag-gag issues); Justin Marceau & Alan K. Chen, Free Speech and Democracy in the
Video Age, 116 CoLUM. L. REv. 991, 1052-53 (2016) [hereinafter Free Speech and
Democracy] (referring to the discussion in United States v. Alvarez regarding the
utterance of false statements).
34 Brief of Food Law and Policy Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Plain-
tiffs-Appellees Animal Legal Defense Fund, et al. at 11-12, Animal Legal Def.
Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 15-35960) [hereinafter Food
Law and Policy Scholars].
35 Id.
36 Id. at 26; see also Becky L. Jacobs, Urban Food Corridors: Cultivating
Sustainable Cities, 91 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 215, 229-30 (2014) (quoting Steven
A. Platt, Death by Arugula: How Soil Contamination Stunts Urban Agriculture, and
What the Law Should Do About It, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1507, 1508-14 (2013)) (dis-
cussing how "the U.S. Department of Agriculture estimated that demand for lo-
cally grown food would rise from the $4 billion market in 2002 to a $7 billion
market in 2012" even though "only fifteen percent of the world's food is grown in
urban areas").
37 Food Law and Policy Scholars, supra note 34, at 5, 12 (quoting Nicole
Negowetti, Opening the Barnyard Door: Transparency and the Resurgence of Ag-
Gag & Veggie Libel Laws, 38 SEATMLE U. L. REv. 1345, 1373 (2015)); see also Peter
Wendel, Distressed Cities and Urban Farming: Are We Making a Mountain Out of a
Molehill?, 91 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 277, 283-85 (2014) (illustrating how an
increase in the demand for local food suggests an increase in demand for
transparency).
38 Food Law and Policy Scholars, supra note 34, at 13, 16 (citing va. State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976)).
39 Id. at 18.
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Part II of this Article reflects on the origin of the corporate
structure and the emergence of individual privacy as a pro-
tected constitutional interest. Part II relies heavily on Anita
Allen's work on the historic nature and scope of the individual
right to privacy to evaluate the merits of the corporate privacy
debate. Part II concludes by summarizing the discussion on
corporate privacy between Elizabeth Pollman, Eric Orts, Amy
Sepinwall, and Mary Fan.
Part III of this Article describes the importance of the cor-
porate privacy debate to agriculture security legislation. Part
III places corporate privacy in the context of the public nature
of food production. Part III points out how ag-gag laws demon-
strate the way some animal and agribusinesses can conceal
nonproprietary information from the public through the politi-
cal process. Part III concludes by identifying how ag-gag laws
disrupt historic and normative understandings of the First
Amendment and privacy on public matters.
I
AGRICULTURE SECURITY LEGISLATION
No federal court challenge against agriculture security leg-
islation has examined the scope of the "right" that ag-gag laws
create. Amy Meyer appears to be the first and only person
charged with violating any state's ag-gag law.40 Meyer pulled to
the side of the public road while driving near the Dale Smith
Meatpacking Company in Draper City, Utah,4 1 and videoed
cows through a barbed-wire fence.42 One scene in particular
made Meyer stop: a sick or injured live cow being carried away
in a tractor "as though she were nothing more than rubble."
43
A slaughterhouse manager confronted Meyer and informed her
she could not film.44 Meyer claimed that she was on public
land and resisted until law enforcement responded to a claim of
trespass.45 Meyer was charged even though the official report
noted the lack of damage to any property.46 The prosecutor
40 Will Potter, First "Ag-Gag" Prosecution: Utah Woman Filmed a Slaughter-
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moved to dismiss the case against Meyer.47 Meyer later re-
ported the experience left a "chilling effect"48 and-along with
others in federal court-successfully argued that Utah's ag-gag
law violated the First Amendment.49
In this Part, this Article explains why corporate "security"
may be insufficient to justify agriculture security legislation.
Justice Thomas, writing for the majority in Reed v. Town of
Gilbert, recently theorized that in the First Amendment context
a facially-neutral law can be subjected to strict scrutiny regard-
less of whether there was a benign motive, content-neutral
justification, or a lack of animus towards ideas.50 Reed in-
volved a challenge by Good News Community Church against
outdoor sign regulations that exempted twenty-three categories
of signs.5 1 The Court identified distinctions between three
types of signs as "particularly relevant": ideological, political,
and temporary directional signs.52 Reed identified the content-
47 John M. Glionna, Video of Utah Slaughterhouse Draws Attention to Ag-Gag'
Laws, L.A. TIMES (May 3, 2013, 7:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/nation/na-
tionnow/la-na-nn-utah-ag-gag-law-uproar-20130502-story.html [https://
perma.cc/X5QD-8BZL].
48 Marissa Lang, Judge Won't Toss Suit Challenging Utah's Ag-Gag' Law,
SALT LAKE TRIBUNE (Aug. 7, 2014 9:08 PM), http://archive.sltrib.com/
story.php?ref=/sltrib/news/ 58267614-78/law-animal-plaintiffs-utah.html.csp
[https://perma.cc/7DCR-8YAH].
49 Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1196 (D. Utah
2017).
50 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015) (citing Cincinnati v.
Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, 429 (1993)).
51 Id. at 2224. The exemptions included those for bazaar signs, flying ban-
ners, and everything in between. Id.
52 "Political Signs" were defined as "any temporary sign designed to influence
the outcome of an election called by a public body." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citations omitted). Political signs could be up to "16 square feet on
residential property and up to 32 square feet on nonresidential property, undevel-
oped municipal property, and 'rights-of-way.'" Id. Additionally, political signs
could be "displayed up to 60 days before a primary election and up to 15 days
following a general election." Id. at 2225 (citations omitted). "Temporary Direc-
tional Signs" were defined as "any [t]emporary [s]ign intended to direct pedestri-
ans, motorists, and other passersby to a 'qualifying event.'" Id. at 2225 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). A "qualifying event" was defined as
any "assembly, gathering, activity, or meeting sponsored, arranged, or promoted
by a religious, charitable, community service, educational, or other similar non-
profit organization." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
Temporary directional signs could "be no larger than six square feet" and could
"be placed on private property or on a public right-of-way." Id. (citations omitted).
"[N]o more than four [temporary directional] signs [could] be placed on a single
property at any time." Id. (citations omitted). Temporary directional signs could
be "displayed no more than 12 hours before the 'qualifying event' and no more
than 1 hour afterward." Id. (citations omitted).
Ideological signs could be up to twenty square feet in area and could be placed
in all "zoning districts." Id. at 2224 (citations omitted). "Ideological Signs" were
defined as "any sign communicating a message or ideas for noncommercial pur-
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neutrality analysis as the first step in the First Amendment
review, explaining:
[Illlicit legislative intent is not the sine qua non of a violation
of the First Amendment, and a party opposing the govern-
ment need adduce no evidence of an improper censorial mo-
tive . . .. In other words, an innocuous justification cannot
transform afacially content-based law into one that is content
neutral.5 3
Reed clarified that "speech regulation[s] targeted at specific
subject matter [are] content based even if [they do] not discrimi-
nate among viewpoints within that subject matter."54 Accord-
ing to Reed, a content-neutral regulation could be considered
content-based under two circumstances.55 First, where the
law could not be justified without reference to its content, and
second, where the law was adopted because of disagreement
with the message the speech conveyed.56
Reed makes establishing whether corporate "security" acts
as a proxy for corporate "privacy" significant and important in
the agriculture security debate. Discriminatory treatment
under the First Amendment is suspect not only when the gov-
ernment intends to suppress certain ideas, but also when the
government seeks to prohibit discussion of an entire topic.57
Agriculture security legislation prevents discovery and disclo-
sure of nonproprietary information about commercial food op-
erations and production.58 Ag-gag laws do so by criminalizing
misrepresentations used to gain access or employment and by
prohibiting filming once access or employment occurs.59
Reed's content-neutrality analysis could mandate a lower
level of scrutiny than strict scrutiny when analyzing an ag-gag
law. Even then, states must articulate protection of a more-
than-legitimate interest. The "lesser scrutiny" Reed character-
izes as applying to content-neutral laws is not rational basis
poses that is not a Construction Sign, Directional Sign, Temporary Directional
Sign Relating to a Qualifying Event, Political Sign, Garage Sale Sign, or a sign
owned or required by a governmental agency." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citations omitted).
53 Id. at 2228 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations
omitted).
54 Id. at 2230 (citing Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530
(1980)).
55 Id. at 2227.
56 Id. (citing ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)).
57 Id.
58 Sanders, supra note 1, at 524.
59 Laurent Sacharoff, Trespass and Deception, 2015 BYU L. REv. 359, 370-71
(2015).
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review, which only requires a legitimate interest. Content-neu-
tral laws require an important or substantial government inter-
est and thus only receive a lesser form of heightened
scrutiny.60
Beyond Reed's content-neutrality analysis, the recent
Center for Medical Progress (the "Center") scandal demon-
strates how the First Amendment already contemplates the
scope of corporate or organizational privacy. In July 2015, the
Center released secretly-recorded video of its members "posing
as tissue brokers [and] discussing terms for procuring fetal
tissue" with employees and representatives of Planned
Parenthood.6 1 A national debate erupted over whether Planned
Parenthood had illegally proposed to sell fetal tissue.6 2 In the
following months, members of Congress attempted to cut off
"more than $500 million in federal money" to Planned
Parenthood.63 By late 2015, several states had already
launched investigations,64 even though "Planned Parenthood
announced .. . that it would no longer accept reimbursement
for the costs of providing the tissue for medical research."65 In
January 2016, a Texas investigation against Planned
Parenthood revealed surprising results: an indictment against
the makers of the secret recordings.66 The charges, which were
later dropped,67 included tampering with a governmental re-
cord by faking California driver's licenses (a second-degree fel-
ony) and the purchase and sale of human organs (a class A
misdemeanor).68 Planned Parenthood subsequently brought a
60 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2232.
61 will Cabaniss & Joshua Gilhin, PolitiFact Sheet: 8 Things to Know About the






65 Tamar Lewin, Planned Parenthood Won't Accept Money for Fetal Tissue,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/14/us/planned-
parenthood-to-forgo-payment-for-fetal-tissue-programs.html [https://perma.cc/
D3AQ-EKSX].
66 Sally Kohn, The Truth Behind Planned Parenthood's Vindication, CNN (Jan.
26, 2016, 5:34 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/26/opinions/planned-par-
enthood-indictment-kohn/index.html [https://perma.cc/MD45-w6HU].
67 Manny Fernandez, Last Charges Dropped Against Abortion Foes in Making
of Planned Parenthood Video, N.Y. TIMEs (July 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.
com/2016/ 07/27/us/last-charges-dropped-against-abortion-opponents-in-
planned-parenthood-case.html [https://perma.cc/S8ZS-D2TM].
68 Kohn, supra note 66.
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civil lawsuit on multiple grounds.69 In April 2018, the U.S.
Supreme Court denied certiorari that if successful would have
allowed the release of allegedly-misleading videos taken at a
private Planned Parenthood event.70
It is unclear how the type of "security" or "privacy" interest
that agriculture security legislation protects outweighs the
First Amendment privilege to gather and disseminate truthful,
nonproprietary information about the national and interna-
tional marketplace of commercial food production. The global
interconnectivity of food production increases the need for the
cross-border flow of information about the industry.7 1 In this
context, the First Amendment plays an important role because
commercial food production is a public matter. More than in-
nocently or incidentally, ag-gag laws hinder undercover investi-
gations into the commercial food industry. By design, ag-gag
laws discourage and prevent such investigations.
Agriculture security legislation "exploit[s] the interrelated-
ness between privacy and trespass and privacy and reputa-
tional harms to prevent disclosure about truthful and
nonproprietary information that a business prefers to keep pri-
vate."72 The legislative history of most agriculture security leg-
islation fails to demonstrate the inadequacies of existing
criminal and civil remedies for violations of the rights of animal
and agriculture businesses. Under most state laws, defama-
tion does not protect against disclosure of truthful informa-
tion.73 Trespass does not always bar access to undercover
investigators.74 Ag-gag laws appear to borrow components of
laws that protect reputation (defamation) and components of
laws that protect privacy (trespass) to create a statutory right
69 Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, 214 F.
Supp. 3d 808 (N.D. Cal. 2016) affd and amended by 890 F.3d 828 (9th Cir. 2018).
70 Imani Gandy, Supreme Court Deals Latest Blow to Architects of Planned
Parenthood Smear Campaign, REWIRE.NEwS (Apr. 2, 2018, 5:36 PM), https://re-
wire.news/article /2018 /04/02/supreme-court-deals-latest-blow-architects-
planned-parenthood-smear-campaign/ [https://perma.cc/NB3E-SDCY].
71 Charlsie Dewey, Ag-gag Laws: Protecting Industrial Farms, butfrom What?,
GRAND RAPIDS Bus. J. (June 21, 2013), http://www.grbj.com/articles/77165-ag-
gag-laws-protecting-industrial-farms-but-from-what [https://perma.cc/Y3MQ-
U5TB].
72 Sanders, supra note 1, at 526 (citing Brief of Amici Curiae Professors
Brooke Kroeger and Ted Conover in Support of Affirmance at 15, Animal Legal
Def. Fund v. wasden, (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 15-35960), 2016 WL 3537328 [hereinaf-
ter Kroeger & Conover]); see also Sacharoff, supra note 59, at 359 (explaining that
the enactment of ag-gag laws "superseded ordinary trespass laws for far more
targeted laws").
73 Sanders, supra note 1, at 525.
74 Id.
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against nongovernment intrusions into nonproprietary infor-
mation that could be in the public's interest to know.
Professors Alan Chen and Justin Marceau, the leading
scholars on agriculture security legislation,75 do not question
the justification for ag-gag laws in the same way as this Article.
Instead, Marceau and Chen discuss ag-gag laws as a hin-
drance to democracy in the video age and advocate for the
recognition of a constitutional right to record.76 Marceau and
Chen demonstrate how ag-gag laws keep agribusiness opera-
tions concealed and discuss the need to protect individuals
from civil or criminal liability for their recordings77 to further
the principles of self-governance, the search for truth, and the
promotion of public discourse.78 Marceau and Chen identify
recording as a preparatory component to expression and
speech-not mere conduct-and distinguish between record-
ing in public and private.79 They conclude "nothing about the
private setting fundamentally changes the conceptual under-
standing of the expressive nature of recording."80
Chen and Marceau also focus on the false-speech analysis
from United States v. Alvarez, in which a plurality of the Court
for the first time extended First Amendment protection to false
speech.8 1 Alvarez involved a prosecution under the Stolen
Valor Act, which made it a federal crime to falsely claim receipt
of a military honor or declaration.8 2 During his first public
meeting as a water district board member, Alvarez claimed that
he formerly played for the Detroit Red Wings, that he once
married a starlet from Mexico, and that he received a Congres-
sional Medal of Honor.83 Chen and Marceau explain how Alva-
rez extended First Amendment protection to false speech that
75 Free Speech and Democracy, supra note 33, at 996.
76 See id. at 1009, 1023-25; see also Brief of Association of American Pub-
lishers et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees, Animal Legal Def.
Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 15-35960) [hereinafter Asso-
ciation of American Publishers].
77 Free Speech and Democracy, supra note 33, at 1026-41.
78 Id. at 999-1017; see also Margot E. Kaminski, Privacy and the Right to
Record, 97 B.U. L. REV. 167, 180 (2017) (arguing that three theories justify First
Amendment protection of the right to record: the first is based on principles of
democratic self-governance, the second on the search for truth, and the third on
individual autonomy).
79 Free Speech and Democracy, supra note 33, at 1017-23.
80 Id. at 1023-24.
81 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 721-22 (2012); see also High Value
Lies, supra note 33, at 1451-54.
82 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 715-17.
83 Id. at 713-15.
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caused no legally cognizable harm.84 Alvarez frowned upon
how the Stolen Valor Act allowed unlimited government control
over one subject at any time or in any setting.85 The Stolen
Valor Act did protect a compelling interest-recognizing and
expressing gratitude for acts of heroism and sacrifice-but it
was insufficiently tailored. The government was unable to
show that public perception of military honors and declara-
tions had diminished or that the government was unable to
counter Alvarez's false speech with true speech.
Chen and Marceau argue that under Alvarez, "high value
lies" warrant more robust First Amendment protection86 and
they identify investigative deceptions as a type of "high value
lie."8 7 Chen, Marceau, and others (including local ACLU affili-
ates and animal rights groups) tested the Alvarez false speech
analysis in several federal court challenges against agriculture
security legislation. A federal district court in Idaho was the
first to find an ag-gag law in violation of the First Amend-
ment.88 Section 18-7042 of the Idaho Code criminalized inter-
ference with production at an animal or agricultural facility,
which included "any structure or land, whether privately or
publicly owned, leased or operated, that is being used for agri-
cultural production."8 9 Section 18-7042 defined "agricultural
84 High Value Lies, supra note 33, at 1453.
85 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 724-30.
86 High Value Lies, supra note 33, at 1480-91.
87 Id. at 1455-1506.
88 Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195 (D. Idaho. 2015),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part by Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d
1184 (9th Cir. 2018). The District of Idaho ruled, on a motion to dismiss, that
section 18-7042 was a content-based restriction on speech. Otter, 118 F. Supp.
3d at 1202. Later, on summary judgment, Idaho argued section 18-7042 only
applied to false speech amounting to actionable fraud, defamation, conversion, or
trespass. Id. at 1203. The court found that Section 18-7042 prohibited "all lies
used to gain access to property, records, or employment-regardless of whether
the misrepresentations themselves cause any material harm." Id. at 1203. "Even
where reporting was truthful (and thus, no action for fraud or defamation would
apply), section 18-7042 would still impose criminal liability." Shaakirrah R.
Sanders, Ag-Gag Free Detroit, 93 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 669, 676 (2016). The
court found that a report on the facility itself, rather than gaining access, was the
harm more likely to flow from a violation of section 18-7042. Otter, 118 F. Supp.
3d at 1204. But truthful reporting is not a legally cognizable harm absent special
circumstances. Id. The court theorized how in Idaho, The Jungle would have
triggered criminal charges under section 18-7042 against Sinclair. Id. at 1201-02
(citing WILLIAM A. BLOODWORTH, JR., UPTON SINCLAIR 45-48 (1977)); see also UPTON
SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (Doubleday, Page & Co., 1906) (detailing the results of an
investigation that relied on untrue statements to gain access into a meatpacking
plant). The court also noted that commercial animal and agricultural was a
heavily regulated industry. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1202, 1207.
89 IDAHO CODE § 18-7042(2)(b) (2018).
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production" as "activities associated with the production of ag-
ricultural products for food, fiber, fuel and other lawful
uses[.)"90 Section 18-7042 prohibited the use of misrepresen-
tations to (1) enter a facility, 9 1 (2) obtain records,92 (3) obtain
employment with an intent cause economic or other injury,93
or (4) enter and make an unauthorized audio or video record-
ing.94 Penalties included up to one year imprisonment and in
some circumstances damages of up to twice the economic loss
to a business.95 When debating the measure, some members
of the Idaho legislature expressed clear animus towards under-
cover investigations into Idaho's animal and agricultural
industry.96
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that Alvarez left false speech
unprotected if "made 'for the purpose of material gain' or 'mate-
rial advantage,' or if such speech inflicts a 'legally cognizable
harm."'97 On this basis, the Ninth Circuit invalidated subsec-
tions 18-7042(1)(a) and (1)(d), which respectively prohibited
misrepresentations to gain entry and nonconsensual audio
and video recordings.98 Idaho's prohibition against lying to
gain entry targeted journalistic and investigative reporters,
which could chill lawful speech.99 Subsection (1)(a) also poten-
tially criminalized innocent behavior to a staggering degree and
was not always associated with a material benefit to the
speaker.100 Ultimately, subsection (1)(a) was found to be so
broad that it gave rise to suspicion of impermissible pur-
pose.10 1 Subsection (1)(d)'s recording provision was deemed an
obvious content-based restriction on speech that implicated
the First Amendment right to film matters of public interest.10 2
In this respect, subsection (1)(d) was both under- and over-
inclusive. "Subsection (1)(d) prohibited only audio and video
recordings but said nothing about photographs." Subsection
90 Id. § 18-7042(2)(a).
91 Id. § 18-7042(1)(a).
92 Id. § 18-7042(1)(b).
93 Id. § 18-7042(1)(c).
94 Id. § 18-7042(1)(d).
95 Id. § 18-7042(3), (4); see Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d
1195 (D. Idaho. 2015), affd in part and rev'd in part by Animal Legal Def. Fund v.
Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2018).
96 See Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1200-01.
97 Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1194 (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709,
719, 723, 734-36 (2012)).
98 Id. at 1194-99, 1203-05.
99 Id. at 1197-98.
100 Id. at 1195-96.
101 Id. at 1198.
102 Id. at 1203-05.
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(1)(d) also suppressed more speech than necessary due to the
vast number of available legal remedies that did not implicate
the First Amendment.103
The Ninth Circuit also pondered the types of misrepresen-
tations Alvarez left unprotected and revived subsections 18-
7042(1)(b) and (c), which respectively prohibited misrepresen-
tations to obtain records and employment with intent to cause
economic or other injury. 104 Obtaining records by misrepre-
sentation causes "actual and potential harm on a facility and
bestows material gain on the fibber."10 5 Obtaining employment
by misrepresentation with the intent to cause injury violates
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implicit in all of
Idaho's employment agreements. 106
The Tenth Circuit left unresolved whether Alvarez applied
to Wyoming's agriculture security legislation,107 which im-
posed criminal punishment and civil liability for trespassing on
private land for purposes of gathering "resource data."10 8 Re-
source data included all that related "to land or land use, in-
cluding but not limited to data regarding agriculture, minerals,
geology, history, cultural artifacts, archeology, air, water, soil,
103 Id. at 1205.
104 Id. at 1199-1203.
105 Id. at 1200.
106 Id. at 1199-1202.
107 See W. Watersheds Project v. Michael, 869 F.3d 1189, 1196 (10th Cir.
2017); see also Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-414(a) (2017), which provides that:
A person is guilty of trespassing to unlawfully collect resource data
from private land if he ... [ejnters onto private land for the purpose
of collecting resource data . . . and . . . [d]oes not have . . . [an
ownership interest in the real property or, statutory, contractual or
other legal authorization to enter the private land to collect the
specified resource data . .. or. . . [w]ritten or verbal permission of
the owner, lessee or agent of the owner to enter the private land to
collect the specified resource data.
Punishment includes "imprisonment for not more than one (1) year, a fine of not
more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), or both." Id. § 6-3-414(d). Punish-
ment for repeat offenders includes "imprisonment for not less than ten (10) days
nor more than one (1) year, a fine of not more than five thousand dollars
($5,000.00), or both." Id. Moreover, "[nlo resource data collected on private land
in violation of this section is admissible in evidence in any civil, criminal or
administrative proceeding, other than a prosecution for violation of this section or
a civil action against the violator." Id. § 6-3-414(f). Additionally, "[rlesource data
collected on private land in violation of this section in the possession of any
governmental entity ... shall be expunged by the entity from all files and data
bases, and it shall not be considered in determining any agency action." Id. § 6-3-
414(g); see also Carrie A. Scrufari, A Watershed Moment Revealing What's at
Stake: How Ag-Gag Statues Could Impair Data Collection and Citizen Participation
in Agency Rulemaking, 65 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 2, 11-13 (2017) (examining First
Amendment implications of the Wyoming statute).
108 WyO. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-414 (2017); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-27-101 (2017).
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conservation, habitat, vegetation, or animal species."10 9 Wyo-
ming criminalized entering private land "for the purpose of col-
lecting resource data" and crossing private land to collect
resource data from adjacent or proximate land.'1 0
The Tenth Circuit examined how agriculture security legis-
lation implicated the First Amendment even when the regula-
tion of speech occurred on private property.1 1' In short, the
First Amendment applies even if only one aspect of the chal-
lenged legislation concerned private property."12 Moreover,
Wyoming punished speech-creation activities differently by in-
creasing the penalties,113 even though such activities receive
First Amendment protection.14 The First Amendment protects
activities that support "the creation and dissemination of infor-
mation"115 because the gathering of facts is "the beginning
point" for conducting human affairs and is "most essential to
advance human knowledge."16 Wyoming could not escape
First Amendment scrutiny by "simply proceeding upstream
and damming the source of speech."117 Collecting samples,
noting legal descriptions, and recording geographical coordi-
nates informs advocacy and other forms of protected
expression.118
Utah abandoned its defense after the Tenth Circuit re-
manded Wyoming's agriculture security legislation for a First
Amendment analysis.119 Utah's law'2o closely resembled a
109 WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-414(e)(iv) (2017); see also W. Watersheds Project, 869
F.3d at 1192; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-27-101(h)(iii) (2017).
110 WYo. STAT. ANN. §§6-3-414(a)-(c); 40-27-101(a)-(c).
1"1 W. Watersheds Project, 869 F.3d at 1194. Wyoming supported the inter-
pretation that its legislation regulated conduct on public land if "an individual
first trespassed on private land." Id.
112 Id. at 1195.
1"3 Id. at 1194-95.
114 Id. at 1197-98.
115 Id. at 1195-96 (citing Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 570 (2011)).
116 Id.
117 Id. at 1196 (quoting Buehrle v. City of Key W., 813 F.3d 973, 977 (11th Cir.
2015)).
118 Id. at 1196-97.
119 Tiffany Caldwell, Utah to Pay Animal Welfare Groups $349,000 to Settle 'Ag-
Gag' Lawsuit, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE (Nov. 18, 2017), https://www.grbj.com/
articles/77165-ag-gag-laws-protecting-industrial-farms-but-from-what [https://
perma.cc/Y3MQ-U5TB]. See also W. Watersheds Project v. Michael, 353 F. Supp.
3d 1176, 1191 (D. Wyo. 2018) (finding a First Amendment violation on remand).
120 Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1193 (D. Utah 2017);
see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(2) (2017) ("[a] person is guilty of agricultural
operation interference if the person[,] . . . without consent from the owner of the
agricultural operation, or the owner's agent, knowingly or intentionally records an
image of, or sound from, the agricultural operation by leaving a recording device
on the agricultural operation [or,] while present[,] . . . records an image of, or
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similar statute in Idaho, and a coalition of plaintiffs brought a
challenge after Amy Meyer's arrest. Section 76-6-112 of the
Utah Code applied only to facilities that were exclusively lo-
cated on private property,12 1 and broadly criminalized interfer-
ence with an "agricultural operation."122 Section 76-6-112
contained one provision about lying and three provisions about
recording. Utah criminalized bugging an agricultural opera-
tion,123 obtaining "access to an agricultural operation under
false pretenses,"124 filming an agricultural operation after ap-
plying for a position with the intent to film,1 2 5 and filming an
agricultural operation while trespassing.126 A federal district
court ruled that the First Amendment barred enforcement of
these provisions.12 7
It is unclear whether Utah would have relied on the corpo-
rate privacy rationale to justify its agriculture security legisla-
tion. As a matter of First Amendment principle, Utah and other
ag-gag states must protect more than a legitimate interest
under both the content-based and content-neutral analysis
discussed in Reed. Arguably, ag-gag laws establish a statutory
"right" to corporate privacy that prevents disclosure of truthful
and nonproprietary commercial information that that is in the
public's interest to know. It is questionable whether preventing
undercover investigations on public matters constitutes a
more-than-legitimate interest.
Neither the Ninth nor Tenth Circuits determined whether
ag-gag laws create a corporate right to privacy. The Tenth Cir-
cuit came close to the corporate privacy debate to the extent
that Wyoming's regulation of speech occurred on private prop-
erty. Idaho attempted to argue corporate privacy as its govern-
ment interest during oral argument, but swiftly backtracked
when Circuit Judge McKeown challenged the existence of cor-
sound from, the agricultural operation[.]"). Individuals who commit agricultural
operation interference are guilty of a class A misdemeanor for the first offense. Id.
121 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(2)(c)(i) (2017).
122 Id.
123 Id. at 1195-96 (citing Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 570 (2011)).
124 Id.
125 Id. at 1196 (quoting Buehrle v. City of Key w., 813 F.3d 973, 977 (11th Cir.
2015)).
126 Id.
127 Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1198 (D. Idaho
2015).
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porate privacy.128 This Article next addresses the corporate
privacy debate.
II
THE CORPORATE PRIVACY DEBATE
Not all animal and agribusiness owners were in favor of
agriculture security legislation. Hamdi Ulukaya urged former
Governor Butch Otter to veto the Gem State's ag-gag law and
publicly stated, in part:
A bill is up for approval in Idaho that, if passed, would limit
transparency and make some instances of exposing the mis-
treatment of animals . .. punishable by imprisonment. This
could cause the general public concern and conflicts with our
views and values.12 9
Ulukaya is the founder and Chief Executive Officer of Chobani,
which opened a major yogurt plant in Idaho in 2013.
In this Part, this Article explores the scope of the "right" to
corporate or commercial privacy that agriculture security legis-
lation effectively creates. The media generally has a great deal
of leeway to determine what to disseminate to the public, and
claims for invasion of privacy are subject to that discretion.130
Line drawing begins when publicity ceases to concern informa-
tion to which the public is entitled.131 As a result, the media
may be liable where publicity becomes "morbid" and "sensa-
tional prying" simply for its own sake-or into matters of which
there is no public concern.132
The intersection between the right to gather and dissemi-
nate news and individual privacy came into the public dis-
course in 2016, when a civil jury in California awarded Terry
Bollea, also known as Hulk Hogan, $140 million in compensa-
tory and punitive damages against the website Gawker.133 Bol-
128 Oral Argument at 8:14, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184
(9th Cir. 2018) (No. 15-35960), https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/
viewvideo.php?pkyid=0000011554 [https://perma.cc/7ZPE-ZVFB].
129 MILK Editors, Chobani Yogurt Opposes Idaho Ag Gag Law, AG WEB (Feb.
28, 2014, 9:31 AM), https://www.agweb.com/article/chobani-yogurtopposes
idahoaggag-lawnaa dairytodayeditors/ [https://perma.cc/NCS3-X53A.
130 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1976).
131 Id. § 652D cmt. h.
132 Id.
133 Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1329-30 (M.D. Fla.
2012); see also Amended Complaint, Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, (Fla. Cir. Ct.
2012) (No. 12012447-CI-011); see also Nick Madigan, Jury Tacks on $25 Million to





lea's claim involved the unauthorized publication of privately
recorded sexual activity with the wife of Bollea's closest
friend.134 Bollea did not consent to the recording or the publi-
cation, which received over 7 million online views.135 The Bol-
lea lawsuit devoted substantial energy to differentiating
between the privacy rights afforded to private individuals and
those afforded to public figures.136 A more fundamental ques-
tion also arose: what makes something newsworthy?137 Bol-
lea's extramarital affair with a friend's wife, and the fact that an
unknown party filmed and disseminated the encounter, was of
public interest because of Bollea's celebrity. However, the pub-
lication of the recording provided little, if any, additional benefit
to the public. The jury's finding that the video recording lacked
newsworthiness, and the amount of the verdict itself, estab-
lished the public's shared role in defining the scope of privacy
and what constitutes news.138
As demonstrated in Bollea's case and established in Curtis
Publishing Company v. Butts, "dissemination of the individual's
opinions on matters of public interest is . . . an 'unalienable
right[,]"' but not an unlimited one.13 9 In the same way that a
business is not generally immune from regulation, the "pub-
lisher of a newspaper has no special immunity" that allows an
invasion into the rights and liberties of others.14 0 Yet limits on
the press "must neither affect 'the impartial distribution of
news' and ideas . .. nor deprive our free society of the stimulat-
ing benefit of varied ideas[.]"141 By extension, purveyors
134 See Kayla Lombardo, The Hulk Hogan vs. Gawker Legal Saga, Explained,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 03, 2016), https://www.si.com/more-sports/hulk-ho-
gan-gawker-sex-tape-lawsuit-racism-explained [https://perma.cc/D42S-9AVT];
Julia Marsh, Hulk Hogan Wants Every Cent of His $140M Verdict From Gawker,
N.Y. PoST (Oct. 31, 2016, 3:28 PM), https://nypost.com/2016/10/31/hulk-ho-
gan-wants-every-cent-of-his-140m-verdict-from-gawker/ [https://perma.cc/
HFR8-XDXV].
135 See Jeffrey Toobin, Gawker's Demise and the Trump-Era Threat to the First
Amendment, NEW YORKER (Dec. 11, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/maga-
zine/2016/12/ 19/gawkers-demise-and-the-trump-era-threat-to-the-first-
amendment [https://perma.cc/2ANK-2XKF].
136 Oral Argument at 8:14, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184
(9th Cir. 2018) (No. 15-35960), https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/
viewvideo.php?pk_vid=0000011554 [https://perma.cc/7ZPE-ZVFB].
137 See Ryan McCarthy, When a Sex Tape is Newsworthy: Privacy in the In-
ternet Era, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2016/03/04/us/Hulk-Hogan-sex-tape.html [https://perma.cc/8ZEK-XHHE].
138 Toobin, supra note 135.
139 Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 149-50 (1967).
140 Id. at 150 (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33
(1937)).
141 Id. at 151 (quoting Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 133).
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should not "fear physical or economic retribution solely be-
cause of what they choose to think and publish."14 2
No individual "right" to privacy, much less a corporate
right, existed prior to the common law or the U.S. Constitution.
Professor Daniel Greenwood traces the medieval roots of corpo-
rate entities to a feudal right to self-government hat was unre-
lated to business endeavors.143 As described by Greenwood,
these rights were limited to the exercise of "power over the
corporation and its dependents without outside interfer-
ence."144 U.S. colonial era corporate entities no more closely
resembled modern day business entities than they did their
medieval counterparts.14 5 At that time, corporations required
a special legislative charter.146
Few corporations were created by the U.S. Revolution.14 7
Professor Lyman Johnson reports that by 1780, "colonial legis-
latures had chartered a mere seven business corporations."148
Johnson distinguishes between businesses and corporations
and discusses how corporate responsibility during the U.S. co-
lonial era was the primary driver behind corporate per-
sonhood.149 In other words, U.S. colonial era corporations
lacked personal gain as a primary motivator150 because a dis-
tinctly public-service dimension controlled-or limited-corpo-
rate identity.15 1 The public-service dimension of colonial era
corporations was not an explicit legal prerequisite, but a reflec-
tion of "a shared belief about the proper focus of corporate
activity."1 52
As the U.S. economy changed in the years after the U.S.
Revolution, so too did the nature of corporations.153 Green-
wood denotes the nineteenth century as the period during
which U.S. corporations evolved as businesses for private
gain.154 During this century, businesses began to take on the
142 Id.
143 Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Neofeudalism: The Surprising Foundations of Cor-
porate Constitutional Rights, 2017 U. ILL. L. REv. 163, 169-71 (2017).
144 Id. at 170.
145 See Lyman Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History of Corporate
Responsibility: Corporate Personhood, 35 SEATLE U. L. REv. 1135, 1144-45
(2012).
146 Id. at 1145.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 See id. at 1144-45, 1153.
150 See id. at 1144.
151 Id. at 1145.
152 Id.
153 Greenwood, supra note 143, at 174-75.
154 Id. at 171-77.
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corporate form 155 and corporate law began to assume its mod-
ern shape.156 Ultimately, concerns about the appropriate exer-
cise of corporate power led to a wide-ranging debate about
institutional responsibility as a matter of corporate duty.15 7
In 1819, the Court held in Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward that corporations were entitled to some rights under
the federal constitution-specifically, the right to enter into
contracts.158 Decades later in 1886, Santa Clara County v.
Southern Pacific Railroad Co. held that corporations were "per-
sons within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment."159
The Court later backed away from this view in United States v.
Morton Salt Co.16 0 Regardless, Delaware famously took the
lead after Santa Clara County and drafted new rules to govern
corporations. 161
The Court has since expanded the contractual rights of
businesses and corporations by the end of the nineteenth cen-
155 Id.; see also Johnson, supra note 145, at 1144-48 (discussing the evolu-
tion of corporations from public-service entities to entities used for private gain).
156 See Greenwood, supra note 143, at 175.
157 Johnson, supra note 145, at 1143.
158 See Tr. of Dartmouth C. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518, 642-44
(1819). A lawsuit sought to compel the Trustees of Dartmouth College to produce
records from the establishment of the corporation until October 7, 1816. Id. at
518-19. The Court found that the college obtained funds through private means
and from private individuals, making it a private corporation. Id. at 632-34. "A
corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in con-
templation of law." Id. at 636. Because Dartmouth's charter was a contract
protected by the Constitution, any acts attempting to amend the corporation were
void. Id. at 643-55.
159 Santa Clara Cty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co. 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886). California
assessed yearly taxes against the Southern Pacific Railroad Company that in-
cluded both the railroad's fences lining the tracks and outstanding mortgages in
its property evaluation. Id. at 395-97. Southern Pacific argued the taxes fell
outside the scope of California's tax authority and that some outstanding mort-
gages should have been excluded from the valuation. Id. at 409-11. California
brought an action to collect the taxes deemed owed. Id. at 397. The Court agreed
that the entire assessment was a nullity upon the ground that California illegally
included property that it did not have the authority to assess for taxation pur-
poses. Id. at 414, 416.
160 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950). Under section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, Morton Salt Company was issued a cease and
desist letter and four years later was ordered to submit additional reports in order
to show continuing compliance with the decree. Id. at 635-36. Morton Salt
Company argued that the Commission lacked authority to compel further reports.
Id. at 638. The Court held that corporations have neither an unqualified right to
conduct their affairs in secret nor equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a
right to privacy. Id. at 652. Corporations "have a collective impact upon society,
from which they derive the privilege of acting as artificial entities." Id. The federal
government gives them the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, with the
understanding that when they do they will be subject to regulations. Id.
161 Greenwood, supra note 143, at 175.
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tury, but the question of privacy had yet to be raised. The
Samuel Warren and Justice Louis Brandeis 1890 Harvard Law
Review publication The Right to Privacy162 "took no position on
whether business entities should be entitled to the privacy ac-
tion."163 This is unsurprising, as another early twentieth-cen-
tury development made corporate privacy an unlikely subject
for Warren and Justice Brandeis: the recognition of a "free-
standing [individual] 'right to privacy' tort[.]"16 4
In the early 1900s, the Georgia Supreme Court held in
Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co.165 that an individ-
ual privacy claim arose from the unauthorized use of a photo-
graph in a commercial advertisement.166 Much of the Pavesich
court's reasoning reflects the modernity of photography at that
time,167 but Professor Anita Allen offers a robust assessment of
Pavesich's merits and discusses Justice Andrew Jackson
Cobb's "arresting analogy between privacy invasions and en-
slavement."168 Allen notes that Pavesich as yet to receive the
same scholarly and juristic "anti-natural law ire" as Griswold v.
Connecticut, which enshrined the fundamental right to individ-
ual privacy under the U.S. Constitution in 1965.169 Allen con-
cludes that Pavesich's natural law theory of individual privacy
illuminates the nature of invasions of the right: they are a civil
injury to "freedom and self-determination."170
By 1905, individual privacy as a tort was only recognized in
Georgia-weighing against the common law as the foundation
for a constitutional right to corporate privacy. Allen argues
that even though "'privacy' does not appear in the original
162 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890).
163 Anita L. Allen, Rethinking the Rule Against Corporate Privacy Rights: Some
Conceptual Quandries for the Common Law, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 607, 612
(1987).
164 Anita L. Allen, Natural Law, Slavery, and the Right to Privacy Tort, 81
FORDHAM L. REv. 1187, 1188 (2012).
165 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
166 See id. at 81.
167 See id. at 78.
168 Allen, supra note 164, at 1188.
169 Id. at 1190; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
Connecticut criminalized the use and sale of contraceptives to prevent marital
infidelity. Id. at 498. Any who assisted the use of sale of contraceptives could be
charged as a principle offender. Id. at 480. A medical doctor was convicted and
fined $100 for prescribing contraceptives to a married woman. Id. Justice Doug-
las held that the Bill of Rights creates a protectable zone of privacy and that
marital relationships lie within that zone. Id. at 484-86. By extension, a married
couple has the right not to procreate. See id. Later, the Court extended Griswold
to unmarried persons in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972).
170 Allen, supra note 164, at 1192.
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eighteenth century U.S. Constitution or in any of its . . .
Amendments[,] . . . rich conceptions of privacy are implicit in
any plausible renderings of the text."171 Allen claims that
Pavesich's recognition of individual privacy derives "from natu-
ral law," and is intuitive to "human instinct."172 Because natu-
ral rights are "'immutable,' 'absolute,' and belong to every
man," Pavesich found individual privacy to be an expectation of
a "just civil society"173 and linked to "liberty and personal se-
curity."1 74 Allen suggests that Pavesich's natural law hypothe-
sis mirrors that which justifies incorporating the Bill of Rights
against U.S. states.175 Allen views U.S. constitutional juris-
prudence that recognizes the right to individual privacy as ulti-
mately culminating in two categories: 1) decisional privacy, as
represented by Griswold, Roe v. Wade176 and Lawrence v.
Texas177; and 2) informational privacy, as represented by
Whalen v. Roe. 17
The question remains whether and which of the "rich con-
ceptions of privacy" apply to corporations. Upton Sinclair pub-
lished The Jungle in 1906,179 one year after Pavesich
Sinclair's expose was the result of seven weeks of undercover
work at Chicago meatpacking plants and was the catalyst of a
federal investigation that ultimately led to the 1906 passage of
171 Anita L. Allen, First Amendment Privacy and the Battle for Progressively
Liberal Social Change, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 885, 887 (2012); see also Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977) (recognizing a constitutionally protected "zone
of privacy" protecting unwanted disclosure of personal matters and personal inde-
pendence in making certain decisions).
172 Allen, supra note 164, at 1197.
173 Id. at 1198.
174 Id. at 1199.
175 See id. at 1198-99.
176 See 410 U.S. 113, 117-18, 152-53, 164 (1973) (overturning a Texas stat-
ute that criminalized abortions except for the purpose of saving the life of the
mother); see also Allen, supra note 163, at 887-89, 895-96, 919 (describing how
Roe's decriminalization of abortion was premised on a more straightforward Four-
teenth Amendment decisional privacy doctrine to embody "a jurisprudence of
constitutional privacy for which Griswold was a crucial precedent").
177 See 539 U.S. 558, 562, 564, 577-78 (2003) (overturning a Texas statute
that criminalized sexual intercourse between persons of the same gender); see
also Allen, supra note 163, at 896, 898, 919-20 (explaining that Lawrence also
represented the kind of "liberty-based constitutional privacy doctrine[ ]" begun by
Griswold and Roe recognizing a decisional privacy right).
178 See 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (recognizing an individual's interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal information, but upholding the constitutionality of
the New York statute at issue); Allen, supra note 163, at 886, 889 n.20, 899,
919-20 (explaining that Whalen represents the right to informational privacy
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment).
179 SINCLAIR, supra note 88.
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the Meat Inspection Act and the Pure Food and Drug Act.1 80 In
the years before and after The Jungle, corporate privacy "rights"
did little to stop robust investigation and regulation of the com-
mercial food industry.18 Animal and agribusinesses were not
the only targets of undercover investigations. Nellie Bly wrote
about conditions in mental hospitals and institutions in the
1890s.182 Film and photographs in the 1950s, 1960s, and
1970s documented bookie parlor operations in St. Louis,183
peaceful resistance in the Jim Crow south, and the horrific
realities of the Vietnam War.184 In the 1970s, William Sher-
man of the New York Daily News received a Pulitzer Prize for an
expose on Medicaid fraud.185 While not always undercover, cell
phone videos of recent police shootings have renewed public
debate on racial profiling and the use of force by law
enforcement.186
Because Whalen u. Roe rejected an absolute individual
right to control information about oneself in 1977,187 corporate
180 Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1201-02 (D. Idaho
2015) (citing Nat'l Meat Ass'n v. Harris, 565 U.S. 452, 455-56 (2012)).
181 See Roger Roots, A Muckraker's Aftermath: The Jungle of Meat-packing
Regulation after a Century, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 2413, 2413-14, 2419-20
(2001).
182 Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, I Spy: The Newsgatherer Under Cover, 33 U.
RICH. L. REv. 1185, 1190 (2000) (citing LOUIS FILLER, APPOINTMENT AT ARMAGEDDON:
MUCKRAKING AND PROGRESSIVISM IN THE AMERICAN TRADITION 234 (1976)).
183 Association of American Publishers, supra note 76, at 24 (citing Zimmer-
man, supra note 182, at 1190 (citing JAMES H. DYGERT, THE INVESTIGATIVE JOURNAL-
IST- FOLK HEROES OF A NEW ERA 166-67 (1976))).
184 Brief for Amici Curiae Abrams Institute for Freedom of Expression and
Scholars of First Amendment and Information Law in Support of Appellees,
Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 15-35960),
2016 WL 3537325, at *5-8 [hereinafter Abrams Institute et al.].
185 See Zimmerman, supra note 182, at 1190 n.21 (citing DYGERT, supra note
183, at 23-25).
186 See Eliott C. McLaughlin, We're Not Seeing More Police Shootings, Just More
News Coverage, CNN (Apr. 21, 2015 7:26 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/
20/us/police-brutality-video-social-media-attitudes/ [https://perma.cc/FAW8-
LC86].
187 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1977). New York created a
special commission to evaluate the state's drug control laws in response to con-
cerns of misuse. Id. at 591. That commission found deficiencies in existing law
and that New York was unable to effectively: (1) prevent the use of stolen or
revised prescriptions; (2) prevent unscrupulous pharmacists from repeatedly re-
filling or overprescribing prescriptions; and (3) prevent users from obtaining pre-
scriptions from more than one doctor. Id. at 592. New York subsequently
classified potentially harmful drugs in five schedules and enacted rules to prevent
fraud by creating official forms, requiring a physician's signature, and requiring
triplicate documentation of the prescribing physician, the dispensing pharmacy,
the drug and dosage, and the name, address, and age of the patient. Id. at
592-93. The New York State Department of Health, which had certain security
provisions, stored one of the copies for a period of five years after which they were
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privacy remained limited to nondisclosure of proprietary infor-
mation. The new millennium has seen continued exercise of
the First Amendment as authority to conduct undercover in-
vestigations into commercial food production. A 2007 under-
cover investigation in California revealed "workers forcing sick
cows, many unable to walk," into kill boxes "by repeatedly
shocking them with electric prods, jabbing them in the eye,
prodding them with a forklift, and spraying water up their
noses."188 Two years later in Iowa, an undercover investigation
documented "hundreds of thousands of unwanted day-old
male chicks being funneled by conveyor belt into a macerator
to be ground up live."1 89 Another investigation in Iowa memori-
alized "hens with gaping, untreated wounds laying eggs in
cramped conditions among decaying corpses."190 In Vermont,
"similarly gruesome footage" exposed "days-old calves being
kicked, dragged, and skinned alive."19 1 Undercover investiga-
tions in Texas publicized "workers beating cows on the head
with hammers and pickaxes and leaving them to die."192
Allen notes that, as of 1987, few courts of last appeal had
ruled in favor of a right to corporate privacy,193 in part because
tortious invasion of privacy was a "comparatively recent phe-
nomenon in Anglo-American law." 194 Allen distinguishes pri-
vacy from publicity by describing the latter as a "heritable
commercial" right that "can be freely traded in the market-
place."195 Allen identifies early jurisprudence that relies on
metaphysical and teleological grounds for denying corporate
privacy.196 Corporations are creations of law and thus meta-
physically lack the traits necessary to ascribe privacy rights.
These grounds "reflect[ ] a theoretical conception of the funda-
destroyed. Id. at 593. Seventeen employees and 24 investigators could access the
records, which were stored in a database located in a receiving room that was
surrounded by locked wire fence and protected by an alarm system. Id. at
594-95. The Court found that whalen could not show a violation of one of the two
types of recognized privacy interests: preventing disclosure of personal matters
and independence to make important personal decisions. Id. at 599-600. New
York had authority to regulate the industry, its legislation was rational, and it
provided adequate safeguards to protect privacy. Id. at 597-98, 601.
188 Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1197 (D. Utah
2017).
189 Id.; see also Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds, 297 F. Supp. 3d 901, 908
(S.D. Iowa 2018) (discussing 2008 investigation at an Iowa pig farm).
190 Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d at 1197.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 See Allen, supra note 159, at 611 n.30.
194 Id. at 612.
195 Id. at 611.
196 See id. at 613-17.
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mental essence of corporate existence."197 As creations of law,
they are also teleologically inconsistent with privacy rights,198
an argument that "depends upon a view about the design or
purpose of ascribing particular rights."199
A distinct body of scholarship has emerged in the decades
since Allen's call for the rethinking of the metaphysical and
teleological arguments against corporate privacy rights.200
Professor Elizabeth Pollman describes corporate privacy as an
"open question," but hypothesizes that corporations likely en-
joy some type of constitutional right to privacy.20 1 Pollman
categorizes privacy jurisprudence for groups or organizations
as follows: (1) the right to make certain decisions without gov-
ernment interference; and (2) the right to avoid disclosure of
personal or proprietary information.20 2 According to Pollman,
the First Amendment often identifies the public and consumers
as beneficiaries of commercial speech.203 The First Amend-
ment also proscribes more, not less, speech to counter fal-
sity.204 Pollman points out how neither public, private for-
profit, nor private nonprofit corporations enjoy a constitution-
ally protectable right to privacy.205 Pollman concludes that
each could have some privacy interests worth protecting.206
Professors Eric Orts and Amy Sepinwall also express un-
certainty about recognition of corporate privacy "rights."20 7
Orts and Sepinwall identify six aspects of privacy that include:
(1) the right to be let alone; (2) the right to limited access to self;
(3) the right to secrecy or concealment of certain matters; (4)
the right to control over personal or other information about
oneself; (5) the right to personhood; and (6) the right to inti-
macy.208 Orts and Sepinwall acknowledge the link between
corporate privacy rights and the individuals involved in those
197 Id. at 613.
198 See id. at 615.
199 Id.
200 See id. at 638-39 (describing Allen's call for rethinking arguments against
corporate privacy rights).
201 Elizabeth Pollman, A Corporate Right to Privacy, 99 MINN. L. REV. 27, 33, 80
(2014).
202 See id. at 62.
203 See id. at 75-76.
204 See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 727-28 (2012) (citing Whitney
v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
205 See Pollman, supra note 201, at 64, 84.
206 See id. at 84.
207 Eric W. Orts & Amy Sepinwall, Privacy and Organizational Persons, 99
MINN. L. REv. 2275, 2278-79 (2015).
208 See id. at 2281 (quoting Polman, supra note 201, at 60 (citing DANIEL J.
SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 12-13 (2008))).
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corporations.209 Orts and Sepinwall describe how rights that
originate with the corporation are primary rights that only it
can waive.2 10 Orts and Sepinwall distinguish corporate rights
from those that derive from the individuals who own, govern,
and maintain the corporation.2 11 The latter are described as
secondary rights, for which the individual owners exercise con-
trol. Orts and Sepinwall also examine the scope of informa-
tional2 12 and decisional corporate privacy,2 13 finding the
likelihood of strong protection for either unclear as a constitu-
tional matter.2 14
Professor Mary Fan explores corporate privacy as primarily
grounded in statutory authority.2 15 Fan discusses how busi-
nesses can contractually keep their secrets intact,2 16 how state
and federal courts commonly authorize protective orders,217
and how, although rife with complications, trade secret laws
can indefinitely shield nonpublic information.2 18 Patent laws
can also authorize nondisclosure for a limited amount of time.
Outside of the aforementioned categories, Fan concludes that
companies generally lack a right-statutory or otherwise-to
control nonproprietary information on the grounds that it is
distasteful or that it would have a negative effect on the busi-
ness or its profits.2 19
Federal Communications Commission v. AT&T, Inc.2 20 dem-
onstrates how the totality of circumstances governs whether
"[t]he law treats corporations as 'persons' deserving of constitu-
tional rights[.]"221 The Court reasoned that "'personal privacy'
209 See id. at 2291-92.
210 See id. at 2289.
211 See id. at 2287-93.
212 See id. at 2309-12.
213 See id. at 2304-08.
214 See id. at 2316-22.
215 See Mary D. Fan, Private Data, Public Safety: A Bounded Access Model of
Disclosure, 94 N.C. L. REv.161, 164, 171-77 (2015).
216 See id. at 174-75.
217 See id. at 172-73, 176-77.
218 See id. at 173.
219 See id. at 163, 187. See generally Paul A. LeBel, The Constitutional Interest
in Getting the News: Toward a First Amendment Protection from Tort Liability for
Surreptitious Newsgathering, 4 WM. & MARY BILL Rrs. J. 1145 (1996); Rodney A.
Smolla, Privacy and the First Amendment Right to Gather News, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1097 (1999); Barry Sullivan, FOIA and the First Amendment Representative
Democracy and the People's Elusive "Right to Know", 72 MD. L. REV. 1, 29-30
(2012).
220 FCC v. AT&T, Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 398 (2011).
221 Lucy L. Holifield, Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Otter: Industrial Food Pro-
duction Simply is Not a Private Matter, 12 J. FOOD L. & POLY 16, 47 (2016) (citation
omitted).
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... suggests a type of privacy evocative of human concerns-
not the sort usually associated with an entity."222 AT&T, Inc.
interpreted a definition of privacy under the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act, but the Court made clear that privacy rights, by
their very nature, were intrinsically dependent on the human
or corporate nature of the holder.223 Ultimately, AT&T failed to
persuade the Court that its case involved "the scope of a corpo-
ration's 'privacy' interests as a matter of constitutional or com-
mon law. "224
An examination of modern U.S. tort and constitutional aw
shows little support for protection of corporate privacy over
nonproprietary information as a fundamental right deserving of
heightened protection-particularly when balanced against the
right to gather and disseminate news about commercial activi-
ties.225 In the following section, this Article discusses the im-
portance of the corporate privacy debate to ag-gag laws and
argues that animal and agribusinesses who operate in the
commercial marketplace can hardly expect to "enjoy a life of
reserve outside the public gaze."226 Moreover, commercial
speech jurisprudence does not protect false or misleading com-
munications. Ag-gag laws upset First Amendment norms by
threatening the search for true commercial speech. In the con-
text of commercial food production, ag-gag laws extend corpo-
rate privacy beyond the individual right, allowing for a degree of
control over nonproprietary commercial information heretofore
unprecedented.
III
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By 1987, Allen had "uncovered no tort cases in which a
plaintiff recovered from a defendant simply because the defen-
222 AT&T, Inc., 562 U.S. at 398. AT&T, a provider of telecommunications and
information services to schools and libraries as part of an FCC program, volunta-
rily reported overcharges under the program and paid restitution. See id. at 400.
A competitor filed a FOIA request and AT&T claimed a privacy interest in the
reports relinquished during the FCC's investigation. See id. at 400-01. The Court
ruled against AT&T and found that Congress did not intent to grant privacy rights
to corporations. See id. at 405-10. The Court specifically pointed to comment c of
section 6521 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and section 97 of Law of Torts,
both of which deny corporate privacy rights. See id. at 406.
223 AT&T, Inc., 562 U.S. at 405-10; see also Sanders, supra note 1, at 528
("[P]rivacy rights, by their very nature, were intrinsically dependent on the human
or corporate nature of the holder.").
224 AT&T, Inc., 562 U.S. at 407.
225 See Sanders, supra note 1, at 528.
226 Allen, supra note 164, at 1210.
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dant used an offensive search or surveillance to obtain useful
or commercially valuable information."2 2 7 Whether any district
court will ultimately define the scope of the "right" or "interest"
in security or privacy that ag-gag laws seek to protect is un-
clear. As discussed in Part I, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits
rendered ag-gag laws unconstitutional without discussing the
legitimacy of corporate security or privacy.228 In January
2019, a federal district court ruled Iowa's ag-gag law unconsti-
tutional on First Amendment grounds.229 An ag-gag lawsuit in
North Carolina is currently pending after the Fourth Circuit
reversed a successful motion to dismiss.230 Setting aside
whether the corporate privacy rationale may be justified in
these cases, questions remain.
Under Reed,23 1 both content-based and content-neutral
restrictions receive heightened scrutiny and require more than
a legitimate interest. The uncertainties of the scope of any
"right" to corporate privacy implicate the necessity or impor-
tance of ag-gag legislation. These uncertainties also directly
implicate whether any ag-gag state can claim a purpose suffi-
cient to justify hindering undercover investigations into com-
mercial food production operations.
Reed establishes the urgency of deciding in the First
Amendment context whether corporate "security" acts as a
proxy for corporate "privacy." Ag-gag laws protect agribusi-
nesses from journalists, whistleblowers, and activists who wish
to gain nonproprietary information. Before ag-gag laws,
agribusinesses lacked security or privacy rights except for
those that protected proprietary information.232 The Court had
also recognized corporate rights in the context of the Fourth
227 Allen, supra note 163, at 618.
228 See Part I.
229 See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds, 353 F. Supp. 3d 812, 827 (S.D.
Iowa 2019); see also IOWA CODE § 717A.3A (Iowa's Agricultural production facility
fraud statute); Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds, 297 F. Supp. 3d 901, 928-29
(S.D. Iowa 2018) (partially denying motion to dismiss).
230 See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Stein, 737 Fed. Appx.
122, 132 (4th Cir. 2018); see also Associated Press, Court Restores Lawsuit
Against North Carolina Ag-gag Law, STAR TRIBUNE, (June 5, 2018, 4:55pm), http://
www.startribune.com/court-restores-lawsuit-against-north-carolina-ag-gag-
law/484629271/ (discussing how the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
dismissal of a lawsuit against North Carolina's "ag-gag" law) [https://perma.cc/
SCL8-4PH4].
231 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
232 See generally Robinson, supra note 24, at 2288 (discussing three premises
in favor of corporate privacy: "(1) corporations are legal persons and are entitled to
bear legal rights, including constitutional rights; (2) corporations have distinct
privacy and property interests that are protected by a right to privacy; and (3)
corporate rights relate to the rights of individuals involved in those corporations").
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Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures.2 33 But even if the recognition of criminal privacy trig-
gered an implication of civil privacy, corporate privacy still re-
mains a matter of state law. State law must acclimatize to the
First Amendment.
Agriculture security legislation creates an incompatible in-
terface with First Amendment commercial speech jurispru-
dence. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission extends First Amendment protection to commer-
cial speech, but limits protection for false or misleading com-
mercial speech.234 Professor Toni Massaro argues that the
"Roberts Court has given quite robust protection to free
speech."2 35 Yet, no ag-gag state has explained how corporate
privacy is more than legitimate, especially when balanced
against activity that has traditionally received First Amend-
ment protection like undercover investigations.
Agriculture security legislation also creates an incompati-
ble interface with Whalen v. Roe, which denied a fundamental
individual right to control access to nonproprietary information
about oneself.236 It should follow that corporations do not have
the right to control the flow of nonproprietary information
about business operations that are in the public's interest.237
The distinction between information with its own value and the
effect that information has on the value of a business should
inform whether corporate privacy or security shields under-
cover investigations into any industry. Prior to ag-gag laws, a
number of undercover investigations led to boycotts, bankrupt-
cies, criminal charges against employees and owners, state-
wide ballot initiatives to ban certain farming practices, and the
233 See id. at 2295.
234 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 593 (1980). The Public Service Commission of New York ordered electric
utilities in the state to cease all advertising based on the finding that the state's
utility systems did not have sufficient fuel stocks to meet consumer demand for
the winter of 1973-74. See id. at 558-59. The Commission continued the ban
three years beyond the shortages. See id. at 559. The Court reversed decades of
precedent and held that the First Amendment protects commercial speech from
unwarranted government regulation based on the informational function of ad-
vertising. See id. at 561-63. Commercial speech that is more likely to deceive
than inform the public may be banned. Id. The Court announced that the gov-
ernment has the burden of proof on the following four part test for commercial
speech: (1) Does speech advertise illegal or unlawful activities or is it false or
deceptive?; (2) Is the law justified by a substantial interest?; (3) Does the law
directly advance the interest?; and (4) Is the law no more extensive than necessary
(i.e. narrowly tailored) to achieve the interest? See id. at 566.
235 Toni M. Massaro, Chilling Rights, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 33, 93 (2017).
236 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977).
237 See Sullivan, supra note 219, at 29-30.
2020] 1201
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
largest meat recall in United States history that included two
years' worth of production.238
Agriculture security legislation calls into question the
scope of the government's authority to privatize nonproprietary
information that is in the public's interest to know. Generally,
the "the right to be let alone" defines the right to privacy.239 As
discussed in Part II, privacy rights do not date back to the
English common law and "[p]rior to 1890, no English or Ameri-
can court had ever expressly recognized the existence of the
right" to privacy in tort.240 The Restatement (Second) of Torts
still denies a corporate "right" to privacy.241 As a result, busi-
nesses generally have "a reduced objective expectation of pri-
vacy in the workplace" unless that information is of a "highly
intimate nature."242
Commercial food production is a matter of public interest,
so any "right" to corporate security or privacy should be bal-
anced with the public right to know. Ag-gag laws alter the
common law understanding that no corporation, partnership,
or unincorporated association has a right to privacy except for
"a limited right to the exclusive use of its own name or iden-
tity." 243 Nor do constitutional law principles ground the type of
"right" to corporate security or privacy that ag-gag laws protect.
This uncertainty over the scope of corporate privacy puts in
doubt whether a compelling or important government interests
exits. As a result, ag-gag laws may be insufficiently justified
regardless of whether they are content-based or content-neu-
tral under Reed.
Agriculture security legislation demonstrates how animal
and agribusinesses operate in the political process even in the
wake of the disclosure of damaging information.244
Agriproducts are the leading cause of foodborne illness.2 45 Re-
cent trends suggest a lack of "progress in reducing foodborne
238 See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1201-02 (D.
Idaho 2015).
239 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A, cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1976).
240 Id.
241 See id. § 6521; § 6521 cmt. c.
242 Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. ABC, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1188 (D.
Ariz. 1998), aff'd, 306 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
243 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6521, cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1976).
244 See Roy Peled, Occupy Information: The Case for Freedom of Corporate
Information, 9 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 261, 270-71 (2013) (discussing how corpora-
tions are able to involve themselves in significant political decisions).
245 See Brief of Amici Curiae Food & Water Watch and Center for Biological
Diversity in Support of Affirmance at 2-3, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, No.
15-35960, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 2734 (9th Cir. Feb. 2, 2018) [hereinafter Food &
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infections,"246 as some strains of pathogens have become drug-
resistant.247 Experts at the Center for Disease Control and
Prevention warn that "even infrequent contamination of com-
mercially distributed products can result in many illnesses."248
Agriculture consistently "ranks among the most dangerous in-
dustries in the United States."249 The fatality rate for agricul-
tural workers is "seven times higher than the fatality rate for all
other workers" and the injury rate is over 40 percent higher
than for all workers.250 Agriculture and farm workers some-
times lack "proper training or protective equipment. "251 Ac-
cording to the United Farm Workers of America, "far too often
industry employers set workplace policies that unduly add to
and exacerbate those inherent risks."252 The agriculture in-
dustry is also especially prone to labor trafficking and wage
theft.25 3 "[A] 2012 survey of New Mexico farmworkers found
that over two-thirds experienced wage theft in 2011, and nearly
half were paid less than the minimum wage."25 4 Wage theft is
exacerbated by widespread practices like "piece-rat[ing."25 5
Piece-rating occurs when workers are paid "a set amount for
each piece of crop harvested," which allows employers to un-
Water Watch]; see also Jacobs, supra note 36, at 222-23 (describing issues re-
lated to risks of soil contamination and remediation).
246 See Food & Water Watch, supra note 245, at 5 (quoting CDC, Trends in
Foodborne Illness in the United States, 2012, (Apr. 18, 2013), https://www.
cdc.gov/features/dsfoodnet2O12/index.html).
247 See id. (citing Ellen Silbergeld et al., Industrial Food Animal Production,
Antimicrobial Resistance, and Human Health, 29 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 151,
151-69 (2008)).
248 Food & Water Watch, supra note 245, at 6 (quoting John A. Painter et al.,
Attribution of Foodborne Illnesses, Hospitalizations, and Deaths to Food Commodi-
ties by Using Outbreak Data, United States, 1998-2008, 19 EMERGING INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 407, 411 (2013)).
249 Brief of Amici Curiae United Farm Workers of America Supporting Plain-
tiffs-Appellees Urging Affirmance at 12, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, No.
15-35960, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 2734 (9th Cir. Feb. 2, 2018) [hereinafter United
Farm Workers of America].
250 Id. at 12 (citing OSHA Agricultural Operations, DEP'T OF LABOR, https://
www.osha.gov/dsg/topics/agriculturaloperations/ (last visited Aug. 19, 2016)
[https: //perma.cc/9325-VBS5].
251 Id. at 13; see also FARMWORKER JUSTICE, EXPOSED AND IGNORED: How PESTI-
CIDES ARE ENDANGERING OUR NATION'S FARMWORKERS 5-6 (2011).
252 United Farm Workers of America, supra note 249, at 13.
253 Id. at 23, 26.
254 Id. at 26 (citing NEW MEXICO CENTER ON LAW AND POVERTY, HUMAN RIGHTS
ALERT: NEW MEXICO'S INVISIBLE AND DOWNTRODDEN WORKERS (2013)).
255 Id. (citing FARMWORKER JUSTICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR ENFORCEMENT IN






dermine state and federal minimum wage laws.256 "[A] 2009
study found that Oregon farmworkers paid on [a] 'piece-rate'
basis earned less than the minimum wage 90 percent of the
time and on average received 37 percent less than the mini-
mum wage."2 5 7
The interconnectivity of global food markets amplifies how
agriculture security legislation distorts the marketplace of
ideas about commercial food production.258 In the context of
this marketplace, "the right to hear-[or] the right to receive
information-is no less protected by the First Amendment than
the right to speak."259 Consumers want to know whether
animal and agribusinesses of all types and sizes are clean, and
whether facilities prevent contamination through good farm
management and humane practices.260 The demand for con-
sumer information increases when government agencies lack
the resources to sufficiently monitor.261 Estimates largely de-
scribe an "inadequate system" for enforcing laws related to
farmworker safety and commercial food production.26 2 Accord-
ing to one Occupational Safety and Health Administration esti-
mate of capacity, "it would take . . . 115 years to inspect each
workplace in the country just once."26 3
Undercover investigations that counter the speech of
animal and agribusinesses hold sway in the global marketplace
256 United Farm Workers of America, supra note 249, at 26-27.
257 Id. at 27.
258 Dewey, supra note 71.
259 Food Law and Policy Scholars, supra note 34, at 13 (citing Conant v.
Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 643 (9th Cir. 2002)).
260 Food & Water Watch, supra note 245, at 13-16; see also Jaime Bouvier,
Why Urban Agriculture Can Be Controversial: Exploring the Cultural Association of
Urban Agriculture with Backwardness, Race, Gender, and Poverty, 91 U. DET.
MERCY L. REv. 205, 211 (2014) (reporting that "in 1920, approximately thirty
percent of the United States population lived on a farm" as opposed to 2012 when
"only 1.1 [percent] of the population live[d] on a farm."); Jessica Owley & Tonya
Lewis, From Vacant Lots to Full Pantries: Urban Agriculture Programs and the
American City, 91 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 233, 241-42 (2014) (discussing chal-
lenges associated with urban agriculture including groundwater pollution); Anas-
tasia Telesetsky, Community-Based Urban Agriculture as Affirmative
Environmental Justice, 91 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 259, 261-62 (2014) (advocating
recognition of the link between healthy food and environmental justice). See
generally Jacobs, supra note 36, at 222-23 (discussing environmental concerns
related to urban agriculture); Lynn Bartkowiak Sholander, Green Thumbs in the
City: Incentivizing Urban Agriculture on Unoccupied Detroit Public School District
Land, 91 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 173, 177 (2014) (arguing for incentives for urban
agricultural education in order to provide educational, entrepreneurial, and nutri-
tional benefits to Detroit Public School students).
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of ideas about the industry.264 Large companies dominate a
large portion of the U.S. economy.26 5 While small farms grow a
lot of food,266 industrial-scale animal factories dominate U.S.
livestock production.26 7 Open Secrets reported that in 2017
over 1000 lobbyists earned or billed over $130 million in lobby-
ing expenses or expenditures on behalf of 440 U.S. animal and
agribusinesses.26 8 Ag-gag laws thus show how a small number
of businesses can lobby to potentially control much of the non-
proprietary information that the public receives about an
industry.
While undercover investigations rarely show commercial
food production in its best light, such investigations do not
"seriously aggrieve" the public when publicity is a matter of
legitimate public concern.26 9 Moreover, the method of gather-
ing and disseminating information during an undercover inves-
tigation rarely causes public outrage. If an undercover
investigation causes outrage, it is usually because of the busi-
ness practices or individual behaviors that are exposed.270
Even where the method of gathering and disseminating infor-
mation causes public outrage, the Center and Bollea controver-
sies demonstrate that First Amendment remedies currently
exist.
First Amendment protection has traditionally included the
means to conduct undercover investigations about potentially
dangerous or undesirable food industry practices. "American
journalists, including some of the most celebrated journalists
in recent history, have often relied on the use of deception,
misrepresentation, and other practices associated with under-
cover investigation to uncover or observe facts and practices
264 See Peled, supra note 244, at 271.
265 See id. at 270.
266 According to the 2012 Census of Agriculture, 88% "of all farms were small
family farms with less than $350,000 in gross cash farm income." UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE NATIONAL AGRICULTURE STATISTICS SERVICE, 2012 CENSUS
OF AGRICULTURE - SMALL FARMS 1 (2016), https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publica-
tions/Highlights/2016/SmallFamilyFarms.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WDG-
UXZD]. Furthermore, "[s]mall family farms operated 48 percent of all farmland,
owned 47 percent of the value of farm real estate (land and buildings), accounted
for 20 percent of agriculture sales, and earned 5 percent of the country's net farm
income." Id. Nine percent of farms are mid-size and large family owned and 3
percent were not family owned. Id.
267 Food & Water Watch, supra note 245, at 2.
268 OPEN SECRETS, 2017, Annual Lobbying on Agribusiness, OPEN SECRETS (Apr.
24, 2018), https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indus.php?id=year=2017
[https://perma.cc/WC9Q-JG8X].
269 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, cmt. d (AM. lAW INST. 1976).
270 Free Speech and Democracy, supra note 33, at 1052.
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otherwise obscured from public view." 2 7 1 Professors Brooke
Kroeger and Ted Conover theorize that deceptive techniques
"are critical to American journalism, and in particular to jour-
nalism involving conditions and practices in agricultural pro-
duction facilities."2 7 2
Within the marketplace of food, the consumer's "interest in
the free flow of commercial information"2 73 includes exposes
about agricultural or animal production facilities.2 74 Leading
food law scholars point to how consumers look to the market-
place to form eating habits.2 75 Eating habits dictate what
farmers grow, and impact conservation practices and food net-
works.2 76 Modern consumers pay more for organic food prod-
ucts that exclude unnatural ingredients.2 77 "Preferences for
fair trade and the movement against genetically modified
('GMO') ingredients also motivate [growing and] buying
practices. "278
Modern consumers continue to expect transparency at
every level of food production.279 This expectation "extends
beyond food safety issues. Consumers want to know every-
thing they can," especially and including distasteful commer-
cial food practices.28 0 Ag-gag laws prevent consumers from
learning about-and expressing disapproval of-the business
practices of animal and agribusinesses and their facilities. Ag-
gag laws seek to conceal unpopular or illegal acts from public
view by criminalizing the tools by which individuals seek to
discover information.28 ' But journalists, whistleblowers, and
activists play a role in diversifying the marketplace of nonpro-
prietary information.28 2 Food consumers may not understand,
but are aware of the limits to obtaining such information.28 3
Many consumers may also distinguish between information
271 Kroeger & Conover, supra note 72, at 5.
272 Id. at 10.
273 Food Law and Policy Scholars, supra note 34, at 13 (quoting Va. State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976)).
274 Id. at 15-16.
275 Id. at 11-12.
276 Id. at 11 (citing Andrew Martin, Is a Food Revolution Now in Season?, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 21, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/22/business/
22food.html).
277 Id. at 9.
278 Sanders, supra note 88, at 683.
279 Id. at 12 (quoting Negowetti, supra note 37, at 1373).
280 Food Law and Policy Scholars, supra note 34, at 5.
281 See Kroeger & Conover, supra note 72, at 6-10 (citing BROOKE KROEGER,
UNDERCOVER REPORTING: THE TRUTH ABOUT DECEPTION (2012)).
282 Food Law and Policy Scholars, supra note 34, at 18.
283 Id. at 19-24.
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with independent value and information with little independent
value except that which affects a business's reputation. Ag-gag
laws prevent consumers from making distinctions by limiting
the available information upon which an informed choice may
be based.
Agriculture security legislation envisions control over non-
proprietary information about commercial food production as a
one-sided proposition where the owner or operator of an animal
or agribusiness holds an exclusive "right." Privacy in this con-
text has other dimensions. Consumers have the right to know
and choose what to consume as a matter of health, diet, relig-
ious belief, morality, and conscience. The public has the right
to government accountability, at least from their government,
because the federal Food and Drug Administration is "respon-
sible for the safety and security" of the U.S. food supply, which
includes over 35,000 farms, 300,000 restaurants, and 10,500
vending machines. Competitors have enforceable rights
against unfair competition. Ag-gag laws fail to consider these
factors, and more, in their protection of the security and pri-
vacy of animal and agribusinesses.
Agriculture security legislation contemplates statutory rec-
ognition of an expansive privilege to prevent discovery and dis-
closure of nonproprietary commercial information on public
matters. Professor Barry Sullivan acknowledges that no Court
has interpreted the First Amendment to contain an "explicit
guarantee of access to information, whether for the general
benefit of the public or for the special benefit of the
press. . . ."284 Sullivan discusses how the right to know de-
pends on "society's view of citizenship and on the strength of its
commitment to that view."28 5 Sullivan's view could encompass
"broader understandings of citizenship and of the citizen's
proper role in a representative democracy" than that which the
First Amendment establishes.2 16 Nevertheless, Sullivan envi-
sions a right to access that limits government regulation to
prevent discovery and disclosure of information on public
matters.287
This Article is not the first to attempt to weave the intersec-
tions between the right to gather and disseminate news and
privacy. Allen called for more explicit definitions of the "'goods'
284 Sullivan, supra note 219, at 29.
285 Id. at 6.
286 Id. at 3.
287 Id. at 10.
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to be won through the extension of the privacy right"288 and
proposed recognition of corporations as a "social participant"
entitled to full compensation for "equivalent injuries." 28 9 Allen
questioned whether privacy law should be expanded to com-
pensate for injuries to a business or property as a consequence
of wrongful access.290 Allen also distinguished between mor-
ally protected and unprotected lies and advocated lying to pro-
tect sexual privacy.29 1 Chen and Marceau distinguished
between high and low value lies and advocated heightened
First Amendment protection for the former. 292 Massaro favors
expanding First Amendment speech overbreadth jurispru-
dence to all laws that threaten to chill constitutional rights.293
Massaro describes free speech as "a rainbow right favored
across the political [and ideological] spectrum[s]."294 So too is
privacy, but as ag-gag laws demonstrate in the commercial
food context, too much privacy can cause inherent defects in
the marketplace of ideas.295
In arguing for the importance of the corporate privacy de-
bate to agriculture security legislation, this Article advocates
neither for nor against recognition of a right to corporate pri-
vacy. Instead, this Article hopes to demonstrate how the un-
certainty over corporate privacy rights diminishes the interests
that ag-gag states seek to protect. The diminished nature of an
ag-gag state's interests could and should fatally implicate the
First Amendment analysis.
CONCLUSION
This Article identifies how agriculture security legislation
implicates the corporate privacy debate and explores the scope
of the corporate right to privacy in the context of ag-gag laws.
Neither constitutional nor common law principles ground the
"right" to corporate security or privacy that ag-gag laws protect,
288 Allen, supra note 163, at 636.
289 Id. at 638.
290 Id. at 615.
291 Anita L. Allen, Lying to Protect Privacy, 44 VILL. L. REV. 161, 161 (1999).
292 See generally High Value Lies, supra note 33, at 1480-91 (arguing that
because investigative deception is a type of high value lie, restrictions on such
practices, including ag-gag statutes, warrant strict scrutiny); Taxonomy of Lies,
supra note 33, at 658 (arguing that the harms caused by-and benefits gained
from-lies allows placement in a spectrum ranging from "socially routine lies" to
"high value lies," and proposing a framework for evaluating the scope of the First
Amendment's protections of each).
293 Massaro, supra note 235, at 33-50.
294 Id. at 47-48.
295 Id.
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primarily because commercial food production is a matter of
public interest. As a result, ag-gag laws may be insufficiently
justified under the First Amendment regardless of whether
they are content-based or content-neutral. This Article advo-
cates for recognition of the importance of the corporate privacy
debate to neutralize the threat that ag-gag laws pose to the
marketplace of ideas about commercial food production and
the First Amendment right to gather and disseminate news on
public matters.
